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CLEAR	  RULES—NOT	  NECESSARILY	  SIMPLE	  OR	  ACCESSIBLE	  ONES	  
Lumen	  N.	  Mulligan*	  
N	  The	  Complexity	  of	  Jurisdictional	  Clarity,	  Professor	  Dodson	  argues	  
that	  the	  traditional	  call	  for	  clear	  and	  simple	  rules	  über	  alles	  in	  sub-­‐
ject	  matter	  jurisdiction	  is	  misplaced.1	  With	  his	  typical	  aplomb,	  Dod-­‐
son	  disentangles	  the	  concept	  of	  clarity	  from	  the	  analytically	  distinct,	  
though	   often	   conflated,	   debates	   over	   rules	   versus	   standards	   and	  
mandates	   versus	   discretion.	   He	   critically	   examines	   the	  many	   diffi-­‐
culties	   that	   render	   the	   creation	   of	   clear	   and	   simple	   jurisdictional	  
rules	  utopian.	  And	  he	  tallies	  the	  traditionally	  uncounted	  costs	  of	  ju-­‐
risdictional	   clarity.	   Dodson’s	   piece	   is	   perceptive,	   challenging,	   and	  
thought	  provoking.	  
In	   this	  response	  essay,	   I	  begin	  by	  arguing	   that	  Dodson,	  while	  of-­‐
fering	  many	   valuable	   insights,	   does	   not	   adequately	   distinguish	   be-­‐
tween	   the	   separate	   notions	   of	   simplicity,	   clarity,	   and	   accessibility.	  
Second,	  I	  note	  that	  crafting	  a	  clarity-­‐enhancing	  rule,	  even	  if	  complex	  
and	   inaccessible,	   may	   be	   a	   more	   promising	   endeavor	   than	   the	  
search	   for	   a	   regime	   that	   is	   at	   once	   clear,	   simple,	   and	  accessible.	   In	  
the	  third	  section,	  I	  contend	  that	  a	  focus	  on	  clarity	  in	  isolation,	  in	  lieu	  
of	  simplicity	  or	  accessibility,	  both	  furthers	  Dodson’s	  project	  of	  illus-­‐
trating	   that	   the	  value	  of	   clarity	   is	  often	  a	   false	   idol	  and	  reveals	   the	  
inherently	   empirical	   nature	   of	   the	   question.	   I	   close	   by	   noting	   that	  
although	   Dodson’s	   piece	   importantly	   demonstrates	   that	   jurisdic-­‐
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1 Scott	  Dodson,	  The	  Complexity	  of	  Jurisdictional	  Clarity,	  97	  Va.	  L.	  Rev.	  1	  (2011).	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tional	  clarity	  comes	  at	  a	  cost,	  his	  inability	  to	  resolve	  these	  underly-­‐
ing	  empirical	  questions	  makes	  it	  unlikely	  that	  he	  will	  quiet	  those	  ad-­‐
vocating	  clarity-­‐based	  jurisdictional	  reform.	  
I.	  DEFINING	  SIMPLICITY,	  CLARITY,	  AND	  ACCESSIBILITY	  
Although	  throughout	  the	  piece	  Dodson	  helpfully	  parses	  concepts	  
that	  are	  often	  confused,	  he	  tends	  to	  lump	  together	  the	  ideas	  of	  sim-­‐
plicity,	   clarity,	   and	   the	   related	   concept	   of	   accessibility.	   An	   under-­‐
standing	  of	  these	  notions	  in	  relation	  to	  jurisdictional	  regimes,	  how-­‐
ever,	  would	  benefit	  from	  a	  dose	  of	  Dodson’s	  typical	  exacting	  usage.	  
Thus,	  I	  first	  provide	  an	  examination	  of	  these	  notions	  as	  distinct	  con-­‐
cepts.	  
A	   rule	   is	   simple,	   it	   seems	   obvious	   to	   note,	   if	   it	   is	   not	   complex.	  
Thus,	   one	  might	   recast	   the	   quest	   for	   simple	   jurisdictional	   rules	   as	  
the	  search	  for	  noncomplex	  ones.	  Professor	  Peter	  Schuck	  offers	  a	  def-­‐
inition	  of	  complexity	  in	  the	  legal	  context,	  which	  he	  defines	  along	  at	  
least	   two	   axes:	   density	   and	   institutional	   differentiation.2	  Dense	   re-­‐
gimes,	   under	   this	   formulation,	   are	   those	   systems	   with	   numerous	  
and	  widely	  encompassing	  rules	  or	  standards.	  And	  institutionally	  dif-­‐
ferentiated	   regimes	   are	   ones	   in	   which	   varying	   types	   of	   decision	  
making	  processes	  and	  bodies	  are	  used.	  A	  rule	  is	  simple,	  then,	  to	  the	  
degree	  it	  lacks	  density	  and	  differentiation.	  
Clarity,	  in	  my	  view,	  presents	  as	  a	  distinct	  concept.	  Clarity,	  which	  I	  
also	  define	  by	  way	  of	  contrast,	  is	  the	  opposite	  of	  indeterminacy.	  In-­‐
determinate	   legal	   rules	   and	   standards	   are	   those	   that	   produce	   un-­‐
predictable	  outcomes	  ex	  ante.	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  clear	  regimes	  are	  those	  
that	  lend	  themselves	  to	  the	  production	  of	  predictable	  outcomes	  pri-­‐
or	  to	  litigation.	  Indeed,	  clarity	  is	  often	  understood	  at	  law	  in	  terms	  of	  
	  
2 Peter	  H.	  Schuck,	  Legal	  Complexity:	  Some	  Causes,	  Consequences	  and	  Cures,	  42	  Duke	  
L.J.	  1,	  3	  (1992).	  Professor	  Schuck	  also	  includes	  third	  and	  fourth	  “complexity”	  concepts:	  
technicality	   and	   indeterminacy.	  But	  he	  notes	   that	   indeterminacy	  may	  equally	  well	  be	  
seen	  as	  a	  consequence	  of,	  as	  opposed	  to	  an	  element	  of,	  complexity.	  Id.	  at	  4	  (“Indetermi-­‐
nacy’s	  relation	  to	  legal	  complexity	  is	   itself	  complex	  .	  .	  .	  .	   Indeterminacy,	  then,	  may	  be	  a	  
consequence,	   as	  well	   as	   a	  defining	   feature,	   of	   complexity.”).	  As	   I	   attempt	   to	   illustrate	  
below,	  the	  notions	  of	  technicality	  and	  indeterminacy	  appear	  to	  more	  readily	  map	  on	  to	  
notions	   distinct	   from	   complexity,	   and	   I	   differ	   slightly	   from	   Schuck	   and	   use	   it	   in	   this	  
sense.	  Also,	  I	  do	  not	  suggest	  this	  take	  on	  complexity	  is	  the	  unequivocal	  definition.	  Oth-­‐
ers	   have	   defined	   procedural	   simplicity	   in	   terms	   of	   aesthetic	   attraction.	   See	   Janice	  
Toran,	  ‘Tis	  a	  Gift	  to	  be	  Simple:	  Aesthetics	  and	  Procedural	  Reform,	  89	  Mich.	  L.	  Rev.	  352,	  
356	  (1990).	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predictability	   ex	   ante—not	   necessarily	   equated	  with	   density,	   tech-­‐
nicality,	  and	  differentiation.3	  
Similarly,	  accessibility	  presents	  yet	  a	  third,	  though	  related,	  notion.	  
Accessible	   regimes	   are	   those	   that	   are	   not	   technical,	   in	   Schuck’s	  
sense	  of	  the	  term,	  meaning	  they	  do	  not	  rely	  upon	  rules	  or	  standards	  
that	   require	   expertise	   and	   specialized	   sophistication	   to	   deploy.	   By	  
accessibility	   I	  mean	   the	   ease	  with	  which	   the	   substance	  of	   a	   rule	   is	  
understandable	  by	  nonexperts.	  Dodson,	  following	  Schuck,	  holds	  that	  
indeterminacy	   and	   technicality	  may	   be	   understood	   as	   elements	   of	  
complexity.	  I	   find,	  however,	  that	  predictability	  and	  accessibility	  are	  
often	   enough	   at	   odds	   with	   density	   and	   differentiation	   to	   support	  
their	  inclusion	  as	  ideas	  distinct	  from	  complexity.	  
A	   legal	  rule,	   then,	  might	  be	  simple	  and	  accessible	  yet	  unclear,	  or	  
complex	  and	  inaccessible	  yet	  clear	  and	  so	  on.	  For	  example,	  pendent	  
subject	  matter	  jurisdiction	  is	  not	  overly	  complex,	  but	  it	  lacks	  clarity	  
and	   accessibility.	   Federal	   courts	  may	  hear	   state-­‐law	   claims	   in	   sup-­‐
plemental	   jurisdiction	   if	   the	   state-­‐law	   “claims	  .	  .	  .	   are	   so	   related	   to	  
claims	  in	  the	  action	  within	  such	  original	  jurisdiction	  that	  they	  form	  
part	  of	  the	  same	  case	  or	  controversy	  under	  Article	  III	  of	  the	  United	  
States	   Constitution.”4	   While	   this	   statute	   employs	   some	   technical	  
terminology—“related	   to”—it	   is	  not	  dense	  nor	  does	   it	   establish	   an	  
institutionally	   differentiated	   decision	   making	   scheme.	   While	   this	  
rule	   may	   not	   be	   easily	   accessible	   to	   a	   layperson,	   it	   should	   not	   be	  
seen	  as	  overly	  complex.	  The	  statute’s	  relative	  simplicity,	  however,	  is	  
coupled	  with	  a	   lack	  of	  clarity	  given	   that	  district	   courts	  are	  granted	  
the	  discretion	   to	  decline	   jurisdiction	  under	   the	  supplemental	   juris-­‐
diction	  statute,	  leading	  to	  unpredictability	  of	  application.5	  Similarly,	  
a	  legal	  scheme	  might	  be	  simple	  and	  accessible	  yet	  not	  clear.	  For	  ex-­‐
ample,	  the	  rules	  for	  consolidation	  or	  separation	  of	  trials	  are	  simple	  
	  
3 See,	   e.g.,	   Edwards	  v.	  Aguillard,	  482	  U.S.	  578,	  639–40	   (1987)	   (Scalia,	   J.,	   dissenting)	  
(“In	   the	  past	  we	  have	  attempted	  to	   justify	  our	  embarrassing	  Establishment	  Clause	   ju-­‐
risprudence	  on	  the	  ground	  that	   it	   ‘sacrifices	  clarity	  and	  predictability	   for	   flexibility.’”)	  
(citation	  and	  footnote	  omitted);	  The	  Supreme	  Court	  2009	  Term	  Leading	  Cases:	  Federal	  
Jurisdiction	   and	   Procedure,	   124	   Harv.	   L.	   Rev.	   309,	   317	   (2010)	   (discussing	   clarity	   in	  
predictive	   terms);	   Abbe	   R.	   Gluck,	   The	   States	   as	   Laboratories	   of	   Statutory	   Interpreta-­‐
tion:	  Methodological	  Consensus	  and	  the	  New	  Modified	  Textualism,	  119	  Yale	  L.J.	  1750,	  
1856	   (2010)	   (similar)	   ;	   Robert	   J.	   Pushaw,	   Jr.,	   Limiting	   Article	   III	   Standing	   to	   “Acci-­‐
dental”	   Plaintiffs:	   Lessons	   from	   Environmental	   and	   Animal	   Cases,	   45	   Ga.	   L.	   Rev.	   1,	   9	  
(2010)	  (similar).	  
4 28	  U.S.C.	  §	  1367(a)	  (2006).	  
5 Id.	  §	  1367(c).	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and	   (at	   least	   in	   my	   opinion)	   accessible	   to	   nonexperts.6	   Yet	   these	  
rules	  lack	  clarity	  in	  many	  cases	  because	  the	  decision	  to	  grant	  sepa-­‐
rate	  trials	  is	  discretionary.7	  Or	  a	  legal	  regime	  can	  be	  complex	  and	  in-­‐
accessible	  yet	   clarity-­‐enhancing	   for	  experts.	  For	  example,	   the	   rules	  
for	  the	  perfection	  of	  interests	  under	  revised	  Article	  9	  of	  the	  Uniform	  
Commercial	  Code	  (UCC)	  are	  complex.	  (UCC	  Article	  9	  is	  a	  dense	  and	  
institutionally	  differentiated	  code,	  if	  there	  ever	  was	  one).	  Article	  9	  is	  
likely	   inaccessible	   to	   the	   lay	   public.	   Yet	   revised	   Article	   9,	   at	   least	  
among	  specialists,	   is	  a	   clarity-­‐enhancing	  regime	  (in	  other	  words,	   it	  
increases	   the	  predictability	  of	   outcomes).8	  The	   lesson,	   then,	   is	   that	  
clarity	  does	  not	  necessarily	  coincide	  with	  simplicity	  or	  accessibility.	  
As	  such,	  marking	  a	  regime	  as	  complex	  or	  inaccessible	  does	  not	  nec-­‐
essarily	  mark	  the	  regime	  as	  unclear.	  
II.	  FOCUS	  ON	  CLARITY	  AND	  RULE	  CREATION	  
Dodson	  contends	  that	  crafting	  a	  rule	  of	  jurisdiction	  that	  is	  simple,	  
accessible,	  and	  clear	  is	  a	  utopian	  project.	  Jurisdictional	  rules,	  he	  re-­‐
minds	  us,	  must	  balance	  competing	  policy	  preferences.	  Yet	   they	  are	  
crafted	   by	   institutions	   lacking	   expertise.	   Further,	   simplicity	   and	  
clarity	   require,	   in	   Dodson’s	   view,	   a	   jurisdictional	   rule	   to	   speak	   to	  
multiple	  audiences,	  albeit	  often	  with	  a	  rule	  that	  is	  arbitrarily	  chosen.	  
This	  is	  a	  bleak	  picture	  for	  advocates	  of	  clear,	  simple,	  and	  accessible	  
jurisdictional	   rules.	  Dodson’s	   antagonists,	   however,	   are	  most	   often	  
advocates	  for	  clarity	  full	  stop—not	  necessarily	  simplicity	  or	  accessi-­‐
bility.9	  As	  such,	  striving	  for	  clarity	  alone	  may	  well	  ease	  the	  rule	  cre-­‐
	  
6 See	  Fed.	  R.	  Civ.	  P.	  42.	  
7 See,	  e.g.,	  United	  States	  ex	  rel.	  Bahrani	  v.	  ConAgra,	   Inc.,	  624	  F.3d	  1275,	  1283	  (10th	  
Cir.	  2010).	  
8 See,	  e.g.,	  Lawrence	  R.	  Ahern,	   III,	   “Workouts”	  Under	  Revised	  Article	  9:	  A	  Review	  of	  
Changes	   and	   Proposal	   for	   Study,	   9	   Am.	   Bankr.	   Inst.	   L.	   Rev.	   115,	   121	   (2001)	   (“While	  
former	  Article	  9	  applied	  generally	  to	  transactions	  that	  were	  intended	  to	  secure	  the	  re-­‐
payment	  of	  a	  debt	  or	  performance	  of	  an	  obligation,	  with	  only	  a	  few	  exceptions,	  the	  re-­‐
vised	  legislation	  pulls	   in	  a	  broader	  range	  of	  special	  types	  of	   ‘security	   interests,’	  which	  
will	  help	  create	  clarity	  for	  specialists.”).	  
9 See,	  e.g.,	  Grable	  &	  Sons	  Metal	  Prod.,	  Inc.	  v.	  Darue	  Eng’g	  &	  Mfg.,	  545	  U.S.	  308,	  320–22	  
(2005)	   (Thomas,	   J.,	   concurring)	   (lamenting	   the	   lack	   of	   clear-­‐cut	   rules	   for	   28	   U.S.C.	   §	  
1331	   jurisdiction);	   Christianson	   v.	   Colt	   Indus.	   Operating	   Corp.,	   486	   U.S.	   800,	   818	  
(1988)	  (arguing	  that	  uncertain	  jurisdictional	  rules	  have	  the	  regrettable	  effect	  of	  allow-­‐
ing	   “[p]arties	   [to]	  .	  .	  .	   spend	  years	   litigating	   claims	  only	   to	   learn	   that	   their	   efforts	   and	  
expense	  were	  wasted	  in	  a	  court	  that	   lacked	  jurisdiction”);	  Merrell	  Dow	  Pharm.,	  Inc.	  v.	  
Thompson,	  478	  U.S.	  804,	  821	  n.1	  (1986)	  (Brennan,	   J.,	  dissenting)	  (stating	  a	  view	  held	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ating	  task	  of	  these	  jurisdictional	  reformers.	  If	  one	  could	  craft	  a	  com-­‐
plex	  and	   less	  accessible	   jurisdictional	  regime	  that,	   like	  revised	  UCC	  
Article	  9,	  enhanced	  clarity	  at	   least	  among	  specialists,	   I	  suspect	  that	  
Dodson’s	  foils	  would	  be—if	  not	  pleased—less	  woeful.	  
This	   raises	   the	   question	   of	   whether	   a	   complex,	   yet	   clarity-­‐
enhancing-­‐for-­‐specialists,	   regime	   for	   jurisdiction	   can	   be	   crafted.	   I	  
am	  on	  record	  arguing	  that,	  at	  least	  in	  the	  28	  U.S.C.	  §	  1331	  context,	  a	  
more	   complex,	   three-­‐part	   regime	   would	   increase	   clarity	   of	   out-­‐
comes—at	  least	  in	  the	  eyes	  of	  courts	  and	  attorneys.10	  In	  this	  regard,	  
the	   fact	   that	   original	   jurisdictional	   statutes	   in	   the	   district	   courts	  
mask	   a	   “welter”	   of	   competing	   policies,	   as	   Dodson	   and	   the	   Court11	  
have	  noted,	  does	  not	  render	  the	  quest	  for	  clarity	  entirely	  quixotic.	  In	  
short,	   increased	   clarity	   is	   not	   necessarily	   at	   odds	   with	   increased	  
complexity	  or	  less	  accessibility.	  A	  more	  complex	  jurisdictional	  rule,	  
even	  if	  less	  accessible	  to	  the	  general	  public,	  might	  well	  lead	  to	  clari-­‐
ty—or	  at	  least	  I	  have	  so	  argued.	  
Focusing	  on	  clarity	  instead	  of	  accessibility	  and	  simplicity	  also	  re-­‐
solves	  the	  tension	  that	  arises	  from	  Dodson’s	  supposition	  that	  clarity	  
requires	   jurisdictional	  rules	  to	  be	  accessible	  to	  the	  laity	  yet	  remain	  
coherent	   within	   our	   larger	   jurisprudence.	   To	   be	   sure,	   there	   are	  
times	  when	  a	  rule	  should	  be	  both	  clear	  and	  accessible	  by	  the	  popu-­‐
lace	   at	   large.	   In	   criminal	   law,	   for	   example,	  where	   ignorance	   of	   the	  
	  
by	  many	  that	  28	  U.S.C.	  §	  1331	  doctrine	  as	  it	  now	  stands	  is	  “infinitely	  malleable”);	  Barry	  
Friedman,	  Under	  the	  Law	  of	  Federal	  Jurisdiction:	  Allocating	  Cases	  Between	  Federal	  and	  
State	  Courts,	  104	  Colum.	  L.	  Rev.	  1211,	  1225	   (2004)	   (“One	  ought	  not	  make	  a	   fetish	  of	  
bright	  line	  rules,	  but	  they	  have	  their	  place,	  and	  one	  place	  in	  particular	  is	  the	  law	  of	  ju-­‐
risdiction.”);	  John	  F.	  Preis,	  Jurisdiction	  and	  Discretion	  in	  Hybrid	  Law	  Cases,	  75	  U.	  Cin.	  L.	  
Rev.	  145,	  190–92	  (2006)	  (calling	  for	  the	  adoption	  of	  a	  rule,	  as	  opposed	  to	  a	  standard,	  in	  
Smith-­‐style	  cases);	  Martin	  H.	  Redish,	  Reassessing	  the	  Allocation	  of	  Judicial	  Business	  Be-­‐
tween	  State	  and	  Federal	  Courts:	  Federal	  Jurisdiction	  and	  “The	  Martian	  Chronicles,”	  78	  
Va.	   L.	   Rev.	   1769,	   1794	   (1992)	   (suggesting	   that	   “jurisdictional	   uncertainty	   can	   surely	  
lead	  to	  both	  a	  waste	  of	  judicial	  time	  and	  added	  expense	  to	  the	  litigants”).	  
10 See	  Lumen	  N.	  Mulligan,	  A	  Unified	  Theory	  of	  28	  U.S.C.	  §	  1331	  Jurisdiction,	  61	  Vand.	  
L.	  Rev.	  1667,	  1674	  (2008)	  (advocating	  that	  28	  U.S.C.	  §	  1331	  jurisdiction	  be	  recast	  as	  a	  
more	  complex,	   three-­‐standard	  rule	  and	  contending	  that	   this	  would	  be	  clarity	  enhanc-­‐
ing).	  
11 See	  Franchise	  Tax	  Bd.	  of	  Cal.	  v.	  Constr.	  Laborers	  Vacation	  Trust	  for	  S.	  Cal.,	  463	  U.S.	  
1,	  8	  (1983)	  (stating	  that	  the	  vesting	  of	  28	  U.S.C.	  §	  1331	  jurisdiction	  “masks	  a	  welter	  of	  
issues	   regarding	   the	   interrelation	  of	   federal	   and	   state	   authority	   and	   the	  proper	  man-­‐
agement	  of	  the	  federal	  judicial	  system”)	  (footnote	  omitted).	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law	  is	  not	  a	  defense,12	  legal	  rules	  must	  not	  only	  produce	  predictable	  
outcomes,	   but	   they	  must	   be	   accessible	   enough	   to	   provide	   the	   citi-­‐
zenry	   with	   notice	   of	   the	   prohibited	   conduct.13	   But	   not	   every	   legal	  
rule	   requires	   this	   same	   scope	   of	   accessibility.	   The	   fairness	   norms	  
(for	   example,	   foreknowledge	   that	   punishment	   will	   follow	   certain	  
conduct)	  and	   the	  consequentialist	  norms	   (for	  example,	   general	  de-­‐
terrence),	   which	   support	   the	   mandate	   that	   criminal	   law	   be	   both	  
predictable	   and	   accessible	   by	   the	  public	   at	   large,	   do	  not	   adhere	   to	  
questions	   of	   federal	   jurisdiction	   over	   civil	   suits	   with	   the	   same	  
strength.	  Without	  going	   too	   far	  afield	  defending	   the	  notion,	   it	  does	  
not	  appear	  unfair—at	  least	  not	  to	  the	  same	  degree	  as	  is	  the	  case	  in	  
the	  criminal	  law	  context—that	  a	  party	  might	  end	  up	  in	  a	  federal,	  as	  
opposed	   to	  a	  state,	   court	  without	   foreknowledge.	  And	   it	   seems	  du-­‐
bious	  to	  believe	  that,	  in	  most	  contexts	  anyway,	  foreknowledge	  that	  a	  
civil	  suit	  will	  be	  heard	  in	  a	  federal,	  as	  opposed	  to	  a	  state,	  court	  will	  
deter	  civil	  wrongs.	  Of	  simplicity,	  accessibility,	  and	  clarity,	  then,	  clari-­‐
ty	  may	  well	  be	  all	   that	   is	  normatively	  valuable	   in	  the	  context	  of	   ju-­‐
risdiction	  over	  civil	  disputes.	  
Furthermore,	  Dodson	  often	  points	   to	   complexities	   of	   interpreta-­‐
tion	   as	   strikes	   against	   the	   ability	   to	   craft	   clear	   jurisdictional	   rules.	  
To	   take	   an	   example,	   Dodson	   looks	   to	   judicial	   interpretation	   of	   28	  
U.S.C.	  §	  1291,	  in	  particular	  the	  collateral	  order	  doctrine,14	  to	  demon-­‐
strate	   the	   impracticability	   of	   obtaining	   clear	   jurisdictional	   rules.	   I	  
agree	  with	  Dodson	   that	   28	  U.S.C.	   §	  1291,	  with	   the	   inclusion	   of	   the	  
collateral	  order	  doctrine,	   is	  more	  complex	  and	   less	  accessible	   than	  
the	  unadorned	  text	  of	  the	  statute	  would	  suggest.	  Nevertheless,	  I	  am	  
not	  convinced	  that	  this	  added	  complexity	  renders	  the	  rule	  unclear	  to	  
practitioners.15	  Indeed,	  the	  Court’s	  recent	  jurisprudence	  has	  cabined	  
	  
12 See	  Jerman	  v.	  Carlisle,	  McNellie,	  Rini,	  Kramer	  &	  Ulrich	  LPA,	  130	  S.	  Ct.	  1605,	  1611	  
(2010)	  (stating	  “the	  general	  rule	  that	  mistake	  or	  ignorance	  of	  law	  is	  no	  defense”).	  
13 See	  Kolender	  v.	  Lawson,	  461	  U.S.	  352,	  357	  (1983)	  (holding	  that	  to	  satisfy	  due	  pro-­‐
cess,	  “a	  penal	  statute	  [must]	  define	  the	  criminal	  offense	  with	  sufficient	  definiteness	  that	  
ordinary	  people	  can	  understand	  what	  conduct	  is	  prohibited	  and	  in	  a	  manner	  that	  does	  
not	  encourage	  arbitrary	  and	  discriminatory	  enforcement”).	  
14 See	  Cohen	  v.	  Beneficial	  Indus.	  Loan	  Corp.,	  337	  U.S.	  541,	  546	  (1949).	  
15 See,	  e.g.,	  Erwin	  Chemerinsky,	  Court	  Keeps	  Tight	  Limits	  on	  Interlocutory	  Review,	  46	  
Trial	  52,	  52–53	  (March	  2010)	  (“The	  Court	  made	  it	  clear	  that	  the	  collateral	  order	  doc-­‐
trine	  applied	  only	   in	  very	  narrow	  circumstances:	   ‘To	  come	  within	   the	  “small	  class”	  of	  
decisions	  excepted	  from	  the	  final-­‐judgment	  rule	  by	  Cohen,	  the	  order	  must	  conclusively	  
determine	  the	  disputed	  question,	  resolve	  an	  important	  issue	  completely	  separate	  from	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the	  collateral	  order	  doctrine	  to	  a	  finite	  set	  of	  circumstances,	  such	  as	  
qualified	  immunity,	  sovereign	  immunity,	  double	  jeopardy,	  and	  con-­‐
tempt	  cases.16	  The	  point	  being	  that	  jurisdictional	  reform	  that	  focuses	  
upon	   clarity,	   even	   at	   costs	   to	   simplicity	   and	   accessibility,	   may	   be	  
more	   forthcoming	   than	   Dodson	   describes.	   Again,	   increased	   com-­‐
plexity	  does	  not	  necessarily	  equate	  to	  decreased	  clarity.	  
In	   a	   similar	   vein,	   Dodson	   often	   counts	   the	   difficulties	   of	   finding	  
facts	   in	  any	  given	  case	  as	  an	   impediment	   to	   the	  creation	  of	  a	   clear	  
jurisdictional	   regime.	  This	   is	   a	  misplaced	   complaint.	   Legal	   systems	  
are	   designed	   to	   resolve	   disputes	   in	   the	   real	   world.	   Tough	   factual	  
questions	   are	   unavoidable.	  Unless	   jurisdiction	   is	   to	   be	   based	   in	   all	  
instances	   upon	  mere	   assertions	   in	   complaints,	   factual	   adjudication	  
will	  be	  a	  feature	  of	  any	  conceivable	  jurisdictional	  scheme.	  Thus,	  this	  
point	  seems	  to	  address	  a	  bit	  of	  a	  straw	  man.	  In	  any	  event,	  the	  adju-­‐
dication	  of	  facts	  needed	  to	  operate	  a	  jurisdictional	  scheme	  does	  not	  
render	  the	  regime	  unclear—at	  least	  not	  as	  unclear	  as	  legal	  indeter-­‐
minacy	  renders	  such	  rules.	  Jurisdictional	  findings	  of	  fact	  are	  usually	  
made	  at	   the	  beginning	  of	  a	   suit17	   and	  are	   subject	   to	   clear	  error	   re-­‐
view,	  drastically	  reducing	   the	  chance	  of	   reversal	  on	  appeal.18	  Thus,	  
unlike	   legal	   indeterminacy,	   jurisdictional	   factual	   complexities	   are	  
not	  as	   likely	   to	   lead	   to	  substantial	   sunk	  costs	   (for	  example,	  adjudi-­‐
cating	  a	  case	  on	  the	  merits	  only	  to	  find	  on	  appeal	  that	  the	  trial	  court	  
lacked	   subject	   matter	   jurisdiction).19	   Nor	   do	   factual	   complexities	  
lead	  to	  the	  inability	  to	  predict	  what	  legal	  conclusions	  will	  flow	  from	  
the	  finding	  of	  certain	  facts.	  Given	  this	  backdrop,	  the	  more	  charitable	  
presentation	  of	  the	  clarity-­‐based	  reformers’	  position	  is	  one	  that	   fo-­‐
cuses	  upon	  alleviating	  legal	  indeterminacy—not	  factual	  quandaries.	  
As	  clarity	  is	  the	  primary	  goal	  of	  Dodson’s	  foils,	  even	  at	  the	  cost	  of	  
adding	   complexity	   and	   lowering	   accessibility,	   the	   jurisdictional	   re-­‐
	  
the	  merits	  of	   the	  action,	  and	  be	  effectively	  unreviewable	  on	  appeal	   from	  a	   final	   judg-­‐
ment.’”).	  
16 See,	  e.g.,	  Mohawk	  Indus.,	   Inc.	  v.	  Carpenter,	  130	  S.	  Ct.	  599	  (2009)	  (declining	  to	  ex-­‐
tend	  the	  collateral	  order	  doctrine	  to	  issues	  of	  attorney-­‐client	  privilege).	  
17 See,	  e.g.,	  Perry	  Dane,	  Jurisdictionality,	  Time,	  and	  the	  Legal	  Imagination,	  23	  Hofstra	  
L.	  Rev.	  1,	  47	  (1994).	  
18 See,	  e.g.,	  Price	  v.	  Wolford,	  608	  F.3d	  698,	  702	  (10th	  Cir.	  2010)	  (stating	  that	  the	  court	  
“review[s]	  for	  clear	  error	  any	  district-­‐court	  findings	  of	  fact	  relevant	  to	  the	  question”	  of	  
subject	  matter	  jurisdiction).	  
19 Cf.	  Elk	  Grove	  Unified	  Sch.	  Dist.	  v.	  Newdow,	  542	  U.S.	  1,	  5	  (2004)	  (raising	  a	  jurisdic-­‐
tional	  issue,	  standing,	  for	  the	  first	  time	  in	  the	  Supreme	  Court).	  
  
20	   Virginia	  Law	  Review	  In	  Brief	   [Vol.	  97:13 
form	  project	  they	  advocate	  seems	  not	  as	  doomed	  to	  failure	  as	  Dod-­‐
son’s	  search	  for	  a	  regime	  that	  is	  at	  once	  clear,	  simple,	  and	  accessible.	  
Complexity	  and	  decreased	  accessibility	  often	  lead	  to	  increased	  clari-­‐
ty	   among	   experts.	   There	   is	   no	   reason	   to	   believe	   such	   a	   practice	  
could	  not	  be	  mimicked	  in	  jurisdictional	  regimes.	  
III.	  FOCUSING	  ON	  CLARITY	  AND	  INSTRUMENTAL	  VALUES	  
Drawing	   the	  distinctions	  between	   the	  calls	   for	   simple,	   clear,	  and	  
accessible	   rules	  with	  greater	  precision	  not	  only	   increases	   the	  odds	  
that	  a	   jurisdictional	   reform	  project	  might	  get	  off	   the	  ground,	  but	   it	  
also	  brings	  Dodson’s	  overall	  thesis—that	  clarity	  is	  not	  always	  worth	  
the	   costs	   entailed—into	   greater	   focus.	  Dodson	   contends	   that	   juris-­‐
dictional	  clarity	  is	  an	  instrumental	  value	  that	  promotes	  three	  some-­‐
times	   competing	   core	   norms:	   (1)	   jurisdictional	   clarity	   decreases	  
costs	   to	   litigants	   and	   courts;	   (2)	   jurisdictional	   clarity	   enhances	   the	  
legitimacy	   of	   the	   judiciary;	   and	   (3)	   jurisdictional	   clarity	   promotes	  
intergovernmental	   relations	   by	   demarcating	   lines	   of	   authority	   for	  
trial	  and	  appellate	  courts,	  state	  and	  federal	  court	  systems,	  and	  judi-­‐
cial	  and	  legislative	  power.	  A	  greater	  focus	  on	  clarity—not	  necessari-­‐
ly	  simplicity	  or	  accessibility—would	  aid	  in	  selecting	  fora	  where	  the	  
effective	  promotion	  of	  these	  norms	  is	   likely	  to	  flourish	  and	  also	  re-­‐
veals	  the	  empirical	  nature	  of	  Dodson’s	  thesis.	  
Take	  the	  Supreme	  Court’s	  jurisdiction	  to	  grant	  certiorari	  from	  the	  
state	   court	   systems	   under	   28	   U.S.C.	   §	  1257.	   Dodson	   rightly	   illus-­‐
trates	   that	   the	   Court’s	   interpretation	   of	   the	   term	   “finality”	   in	   this	  
statute	  is	  malleable	  at	  best.	  He	  uses	  this	  as	  an	  example	  of	  the	  inher-­‐
ent	  lack	  of	  clarity	  that	  the	  task	  of	  judicial	  interpretation	  injects	  into	  
jurisdictional	   regimes,	   rendering,	   in	  part,	   the	   search	   for	   clear,	   sim-­‐
ple,	  and	  accessible	  jurisdictional	  rules	  utopian.	  Perhaps	  more	  to	  the	  
point	  of	  Dodson’s	  project,	  however,	  the	  creation	  of	  a	  clear	  (in	  other	  
words,	  predictable)	  jurisdictional	  rule	  under	  28	  U.S.C.	  §	  1257	  would	  
not	  foster	  the	  very	  norms	  that	  clear	  jurisdictional	  rules	  are	  designed	  
to	  serve.	  Unlike	  original	  district	  court	  jurisdiction—where	  the	  find-­‐
ing	   of	   jurisdiction,	   abstention	   excepted,	   leads	   to	   the	   court	   hearing	  
the	   case,	   assuming	   personal	   jurisdiction,	   venue,	   and	   service—the	  
existence	   of	   the	   Supreme	   Court’s	   appellate	   jurisdiction	   under	   28	  
U.S.C.	  §	  1257	  is	  merely	  a	  precursor	  to	  the	  main	  event	  of	  the	  exercise	  
of	  its	  discretion	  to	  issue	  a	  writ	  of	  certiorari.	  As	  such,	  even	  with	  a	  re-­‐
gime	  of	   clear	  28	  U.S.C.	   §	  1257	   jurisdictional	   rules,	   litigants	   seeking	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Supreme	  Court	  review	  would	  still	  have	  to	  expend	  substantial	  funds	  
without	   the	  guarantee	   that	   the	  Court	  will	  address	   their	  case.	  Given	  
the	   discretionary	   nature	   of	   the	   case	   selection	   of	   the	   Court,	   clear	  
rules	  under	  28	  U.S.C.	  §	  1257	  are	  not	  likely	  to	  enhance	  the	  legitimacy	  
of	   the	  Court’s	  decision	  making	  process.20	  Moreover,	  given	   the	  hier-­‐
archical	   nature	   of	   the	   Supreme	   Court	   vis-­‐à-­‐vis	   the	   state-­‐court	   sys-­‐
tems,	   a	   more	   unpredictable	   “threat”	   of	   Supreme	   Court	   review,	   as	  
Dodson	   later	   notes,	   might	   further	   federalism	   considerations	   as	  
much	  as	  hinder	  them.21	  Jurisdictional	  clarity	  in	  this	  context,	  then,	  is	  
unlikely	   to	   foster	   the	  values	  upon	  which	   it	   is	  grounded.	  Separating	  
clarity	   from	   complexity	   and	   accessibility,	   therefore,	   strengthens	  
Dodson’s	   thesis	   by	   illustrating	  with	   greater	   precision	   that	   there	   is	  
little	  benefit	  to	  be	  gained	  from	  clear	  jurisdictional	  rules	  in	  some	  con-­‐
texts,	  such	  as	  28	  U.S.C.	  §	  1257.	  
This	   focus	  on	  clarity,	   in	   lieu	  of	  simplicity	  or	  accessibility	  also	  re-­‐
veals	  a	  deeper	  issue	  with	  Dodson’s	  project	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  norms	  
clarity	   aims	   to	   promote.	   Achievement	   of	   decreased	   costs	   and	  
smoother	  intergovernmental	  relations—two	  of	  the	  three	  values	  that	  
Dodson	   outlines	   as	   the	   objects	   of	   a	   clear	   jurisdictional	   regime—
raises	   difficult	   empirical	   questions.	   Dodson,	   for	   example,	   contends	  
that	  the	  well-­‐pleaded	  complaint	  rule,22	  although	  clear	  and	  simple,	  is	  
flawed	  because	  it	  is	  both	  underinclusive	  and	  overinclusive	  as	  to	  the	  
principles	  upon	  which	  it	  is	  based.	  But	  if	  we	  are	  to	  test	  whether	  a	  dif-­‐
ferent	  jurisdictional	  regime	  for	  vesting	  federal	  question	  jurisdiction	  
produces	  better	   results	   in	   terms	  of	  wasted	  costs	  and	  ease	  of	   inter-­‐
governmental	   relations,	   this	   raises	   an	   empirical	   question—and	   a	  
quite	   complex	   one	   at	   that.	   Unlike	   differing	   jurisdictional	   regimes	  
among	   the	   states,	   federal	   subject	   matter	   jurisdiction	   is	   uniform	  
across	  the	  country.	  Excepting	  the	  possibility	  of	  making	  comparisons	  
based	  upon	  circuit	  splits,	  there	  is	  not	  a	  control	  group	  against	  which	  
to	  measure.	  The	  cost-­‐saving	  feature,	  for	  instance,	  of	  federal	  jurisdic-­‐
tional	  regime	  one	  versus	  regime	  two,	  then,	  remains	  a	  matter	  of	  pure	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conjecture.	  Dodson,	  in	  fact,	  acknowledges	  this	  unresolved	  empirical	  
quandary.	  
This	   lack	   of	   key	   factual	   data	  may	  well	   end	   the	   clarity-­‐based	   re-­‐
form	   debate	   as	   a	   productive	   enterprise.	   Dodson’s	   contribution	   to	  
this	  discussion—that	   clarity	   comes	  at	  a	   cost—is	  a	  worthy	  one.	  But	  
without	  answers	  to	  the	  essential	  empirical	  questions	  underlying	  this	  
debate,	   it	   is	   hard	   to	   see	   the	   discussion	   advancing	   much	   farther.	  
Some	  discussants,	   such	   as	  myself,	  will	   remain	   inclined	   to	   view	   the	  
implementation	   of	   a	   more	   complex	   and	   inaccessible	   jurisdictional	  
regime	  as	  likely	  to	  reduce	  net	  costs	  and	  intergovernmental	  friction.	  
Others	   may	   disagree.	   Dodson	   himself	   decries	   the	   lack	   of	   empirics	  
here,	  which	  suggests	  that	  with	  no	  means	  available	  to	  test	  competing	  
empirical	  intuitions	  the	  debate	  may	  be	  at	  an	  impasse.	  
CONCLUSION	  
Once	  again,	  Professor	  Dodson	  has	  offered	  an	  important	  contribu-­‐
tion	  to	  jurisdictional	  scholarship.	  Even	  if,	  after	  discounting	  complex-­‐
ity	  and	  inaccessibility	  expenses,	  the	  costs	  of	  clarity	  are	  not	  as	  signif-­‐
icant	   as	   he	   presents	   them,	   Dodson	   is	   right	   to	   demand	   that	   these	  
costs	  of	  clarity	  be	  included	  into	  the	  calculus	  for	  those	  advancing	  ju-­‐
risdictional	  reform.	  Nevertheless,	  we	  are	  left	  to	  measure	  these	  costs	  
by	  guesstimation	  alone,	  which	  may	  well	  doom	  this	  reformation	  de-­‐
bate	  to	  one	  of	  the	  many	  insoluble	  intuitional	  clashes	  that	  plague	  le-­‐
gal	  scholars.	  
	  
